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The appropriate description of fluctuations within the framework of evolutionary game theory
is a fundamental unsolved problem in the case of finite populations. The Moran process recently
introduced into this context in Nowak et al., [Nature (London) 428, 646 (2004)] defines a promising
standard model of evolutionary game theory in finite populations for which analytical results are
accessible. In this paper, we derive the stationary distribution of the Moran process population
dynamics for arbitrary 2×2 games for the finite size case. We show that a nonvanishing background
fitness can be transformed to the vanishing case by rescaling the payoff matrix. In contrast to the
common approach to mimic finite-size fluctuations by Gaussian distributed noise, the finite-size
fluctuations can deviate significantly from a Gaussian distribution.
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Theoretical studies of coevolutionary dynamics usually
assume infinite populations, as the replicator dynamics
[1, 2] or the Lotka-Volterra equations [3, 4]. The limit of
infinite populations leading to deterministic differential
equations is an idealization motivated mainly by math-
ematical convenience. Only in few cases the population
will be large enough to justify the assumption of infinite
populations.
In finite populations, crucial differences can appear.
Population states that cannot be invaded by a small frac-
tion of mutants in infinite population, so-called Evolu-
tionary Stable Strategies [1], can be invaded by a single
mutant [5]. In addition, a certain inherent stochasticity is
always present in finite populations. In multipopulation
interactions, such fluctuations can possibly be exploited
[6]. In this paper, we quantify the inherent fluctuations
arising from finite populations. As a starting point, we
investigate the classical Moran process [7] that was re-
cently transfered to frequency dependent selection [5, 8].
In a Moran process, in each time step one agent is repli-
cated and one agent is eliminated. Thus the total size
of the population is strictly conserved. This process can
be considered as a standard model for game dynamics in
finite populations. Although a strictly fixed population
size will be fulfilled only in systems with hard resource
limitations, e.g. a fixed number of academic positions, it
is a widely common default, especially in spatial games
[9, 10, 11, 12, 13]. From a systematic point of view, the
dynamics within this process and the nature of the fluc-
tuations have to be understood before a generalization to
variable population sizes on solid grounds is possible.
In [14] we have shown that the Moran process intro-
duced in [5] can be derived as a mean-field approximation
of the finite population game dynamics. In mean-field
theories of evolutionary game theory [15, 16, 17, 18] not
only the spatial degrees of freedom are neglected; but
the limit of infinite populations also implies a transition
from a stochastic system to a deterministic equation of
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motion. While the average effect of mutations can of-
ten be lumped in a deterministic term [15, 21], different
ways to incorporate external stochasticity have been pro-
posed, e.g. by a Langevin term of Gaussian distributed
noise [6, 19, 20] or stochastic payoffs [22]. Consequently,
one could also approximate the intrinsic noise of the finite
system by Gaussian noise reintroduced into the contin-
uum equations. But a priori it is not clear, in which
situation this approximation is justified. Especially in
small populations, the inherent stochasticity may signif-
icantly exceed any external noise. In a finite-round Pris-
oner’s Dilemma game, the broadness of the distribution
of cooperators recently was found to promote coopera-
tion [23]. Further, the distribution decay of fluctuations
is known to be of substantial impact both in genetic evo-
lutionary dynamics [24] and in evolutionary optimization
[25].
To clarify the nature of inherent fluctuations of evo-
lutionary dynamics in a Moran process is the scope of
this paper. We quantify the deviations from the mean
value by explicitly calculating the stationary distribu-
tion of strategies for general 2×2 games and provide a
transformation for the case of nonvanishing background
fitness. The process is illustrated with two qualitatively
representative kinds of games, and the exact solution,
also for the more realistic situation of a nonvanishing
background fitness, is provided.
Moran evolution dynamics in 2×2 games.— We con-
sider a finite population of N agents of two different types,
A and B, interacting in a game with the payoff matrix
P =
(
a b
c d
)
. (1)
Each agent interacts with a certain number of randomly
chosen partners. The A individual s obtains the fitness
piAs = 1− w + w
nAs a+ n
B
s b
nAs + n
B
s
, (2)
where nAs (n
B
s ) is the number of interactions with A (B)
individuals. 0 ≤ w ≤ 1 measures the contribution of
the game to the fitness, 1− w is the background fitness.
2An equivalent equation holds for B agents. Occasion-
ally, the payoff of a randomly chosen individual s is com-
pared with the payoff of another randomly chosen agent
u. With probability pis/(pis + piu), a copy of agent s re-
places agent u. With probability piu/(pis + piu), agent s
is replaced by a copy of u. The probability that an agent
reproduces is hence proportional to its payoff. The pay-
off depends on the type of the individual and on the kind
of its interactions. This approach is frequently used in
simulations of multiagent systems [26, 27, 28, 29], genetic
algorithms [30, 31], and evolutionary game theory [16].
The averaged dynamics of this model can be computed
from a mean-field theory [14]. If every agent interacts
with a representative sample of the population, the aver-
age payoff of A and B individuals will be, respectively,
piA(i) = 1− w + w
a(i − 1) + b(N − i)
N − 1
(3)
piB(i) = 1− w + w
c i + d(N − 1− i)
N − 1
,
where i is the number of A individuals. We explicitly
excluded self interactions. An individual is selected for
reproduction with a probability proportional to its pay-
off, as described above. It replaces an individual that is
chosen at random. This reduces the process to a Moran
process [7], which was recently transfered to a game the-
oretic context [5, 8]. The corresponding mean-field dy-
namics is given by a Markov process with the transition
probabilities [14]
Ti→i+1 =
piA(i) i
piA(i)i + piB(i) (N − i)
N − i
N
(4)
Ti→i−1 =
piB(i) (N − i)
piA(i)i + piB(i) (N − i)
i
N
Ti→i = 1− Ti→i+1 − Ti→i−1.
All other transition probabilities are zero. The states
i = 0 and i = N are absorbing, while the remaining
states are transient. Conveniently, a small mutation can
be introduced to allow for an escape from the absorbing
states [32].
The general case of nonvanishing background fitness.
For a nonvanishing background fitness 1−w > 0 the tran-
sition properties obtained directly from Eqs. (3) and (4)
become quite lengthy. A more elegant way is to rescale
the payoff matrix of a given 2×2 game according to(
a′ b′
c′ d′
)
=
(
1 + (a− 1)w 1 + (b− 1)w
1 + (c− 1)w 1 + (d− 1)w
)
. (5)
With this rescaled payoff matrix, a vanishing background
fitness can be assumed in (3) without loss of generality.
Fluctuations around the average strategy: In order to
quantify the deviations from the average strategy of the
system, we compute the stationary distribution Pi for
this system. We assume a small mutation probability µ.
For µ≪ 1, mutations affect the system only in the states
that are absorbing for µ = 0. In this case, the strategy
distribution is generated only by the inherent stochastic-
ity of the finite population. The stationary probability
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FIG. 1: Stationary probability distribution for different evolu-
tionary dynamics depending on the distance to the maximum
(N=100). For comparison, also the slow decay for neutral evo-
lution is shown. The decay of the distribution can be fitted
by a stretched exponential exp(−bxγ) with γ = 2.06 (antico-
ordination game), γ = 0.87 (constant fitness), and γ = 0.63
(Prisoner’s Dilemma). The inset shows the same data where
both axes are logarithmized, thus stretched exponentials ap-
pear as straight lines. The decay deviates significantly from
a Gaussian distribution for constant fitness and Prisoner’s
Dilemma, corresponding to a random motion in an anhar-
monic potential.
can be computed in the interior independently from the
boundaries, the correct normalization can then be found
analyzing the transitions from the boundaries to the in-
terior, i.e. P0µ = P1T1→0.
Let us first consider the neutral evolution limit of w =
0, where the fitness is constant and independent of the
type. The payoffs are piA(i) = piB(i) = 1. This implies
Ti→i+1 = Ti→i−1 =
i(N − i)
N2
. (6)
From Pi Ti→i+1 = Pi+1 Ti+1→i we find in equilibrium for
0 < i < N
Pi ∝
1
(N − i)i
(7)
which has a minimum at i = N/2. The equilibrium dis-
tribution arises from a neutral evolution of two types, as
known from population genetics [33].
Constant fitness. The simplest case for w > 0 is the
case of constant fitness, i.e., a = b < c = d = 1. The
evolutionary dynamics drifts towards the type B, which
has higher fitness. We find for the stationary probability
distribution (0 < i < N − 1)
Pi+1
Pi
= r
r(i + 1) +N − i− 1
ri +N − i
i
i+ 1
N − i
N − i− 1
, (8)
where r = 1−w +wa < 1. Far from the borders (at i =
0, N), Pi+1/Pi converges to r implying an exponential
decay of the stationary probability distribution.
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FIG. 2: Scaling of the variance, normalized by N , of the finite-
size fluctuations for anticoordination game (slope −1/2), con-
stant fitness (slope −1), and Prisoner’s dilemma (slope −3/2).
For neutral evolution (not shown) the variance increases faster
than N.
Internal Nash equilibrium. For frequency dependent
fitness and w > 0, the game can have an internal Nash
equilibrium or an equilibrium in one of the absorbing
states.
As a simple example with an internal Nash equilibrium
we choose a simple “anticoordination” game with w = 1,
P =
(
0 1
1 0
)
. (9)
For the transition probabilities, we find
Ti→i+1 =
N − i
2N
(10)
Ti→i−1 =
i
2N
,
which describes a random walk with a drift towards the
deterministic fixed point i = N/2. In equilibrium, we
have Pi Ti→i+1 = Pi+1 Ti+1→i for every i, which leads to
Pi+1 = P0
i∏
j=0
N − j
j + 1
= P0
(
N
i+ 1
)
, (11)
where P0 is determined by normalization. Pi is a bino-
mial distribution around the equilibrium of the replicator
dynamics at i = N/2, Pi = 2
−N
(
N
i
)
.
Prisoner’s Dilemma: Nash equilibrium at the border.
The Prisoner’s Dilemma [34] is a standard model, where
mutual cooperation leads to highest payoff in the iter-
ated game. It is motivated by the situation where two
prisoners can reduce their time in prison by witnessing
the other’s guilt (“defect”). On the other hand, if both
“cooperate” and refrain from blaming the other, both re-
ceive a reduction of punishment. This is described with
parameters fulfilling c > a > d > b; the dilemma sit-
uation originates from the temptation c > a, defection
yields a higher payoff if the opponent cooperates. In its
standard parameters, the Prisoner’s Dilemma is defined
by the payoff matrix
P =
(
3 0
5 1
)
. (12)
which has a Nash equilibrium for mutual defection, i.e.
i = 0. As b = 0, also state i = 1 is absorbing for w = 1
(two cooperators are needed to promote cooperation).
Thus a small mutation rate µ has to be assumed also
for T1→2. Alternatively one could assume w < 1. The
transition probabilities are given by
Ti→i+1 =
3i− 3
−i2 − 2i+ 3iN +N(N − 1)
i(N − i)
N
(13)
Ti→i−1 =
4i+N − 1
−i2 − 2i+ 3iN +N(N − 1)
i(N − i)
N
.
From this, a closed form of the probability distribution
can be derived (see below for a derivation with arbitrary
payoff matrix). A comparison between different station-
ary distributions is shown in Fig. 1. The finite-size scaling
of the variance is shown for the same cases in Fig. 2.
Stationary Distribution for an arbitrary payoff matrix.
For the ratio of the transition probabilities between i and
i+ 1 we find with w = 1, cf. Eq. (4),
Ti→i+1
Ti+1→i
=
piA(i)
ipiA(i) + (N − i)piB(i)
(i + 1)piA(i+ 1) + (N − i− 1)piB(i + 1)
piB(i + 1)
i(N − i)
(i + 1)(N − i− 1)
=
a(i− 1) + b(N − i)
c(i+ 1) + d(N − i− 2)
i(N − i)[(i+ 1)2(a− b− c+ d) + (i + 1)(−a+ bN + cN + d− 2dN) +N(N − 1)d]
(i+ 1)(N − i− 1)[i2(a− b− c+ d) + i(−a+ bN + cN + d− 2dN) +N(N − 1)d]
=
a− b
c− d
i−N5
i−N6
i(N − i)
(i+ 1)(N − i− 1)
(i−N1)(i −N3)
(i−N2)(i −N4)
. (14)
Here N1 · · ·N4 are the roots of the quadratic expressions in i and N5 =
a−bN
a−b
, N6 =
c+d(N−2)
d−c
. We have excluded the
special cases a− b = 0, c − d = 0 discussed above in (8) and (a− b)/(c − d) = 1, where some factors do not depend
on i and part of the expression simplifies. For N − 1 > k ≥ j > 1, the density of the stationary state can be solved
4explicitly giving rising factorials (Pochhammer symbols), or equivalently, quotients of Gamma functions,
Pk
Pj
=
k−1∏
i=j
Ti→i+1
Ti+1→i
=
(
a− b
c− d
)k−j
·
j(N − j)
k(N − k)
·
Γ(k −N5)Γ(j −N6)Γ(k −N1)Γ(j −N2)Γ(k −N3)Γ(j −N4)
Γ(j −N5)Γ(k −N6)Γ(j −N1)Γ(k −N2)Γ(j −N3)Γ(k −N4)
(15)
which yields, after calculating PN/PN−1 and P1/P0 ex-
plicitly, and after normalization, the total density of the
stationary state. Equations (5) and (15) cover the general
case of 2×2 games including nonvanishing background
fitness. The previously discussed examples are included
as special cases.
To conclude, the distribution of the fluctuations
around a Nash equilibrium can be nontrivially broad-
ened in realistic models of evolutionary game theory. We
analyzed the effect of internal noise stemming from the
inherent evolutionary update fluctuations in a finite pop-
ulation. In general, internal noise and externally imposed
stochastic forces can follow qualitatively different distri-
butions. In our paper, we concentrated on the impor-
tant case of a Moran process, which can be considered
as a standard model of evolutionary game dynamics in
finite populations. For the Moran process, the effect of
the finite size of the population can be accessed directly.
Neglecting external noise, we have shown that the sta-
tionary distribution of the Moran process of evolutionary
2×2 games can be calculated analytically and yields dif-
ferent decay tails of the distributions. Depending on the
payoff matrix and the location of the Nash equilibrium,
the finite size fluctuations may deviate significantly from
a Gaussian distribution.
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